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Westgren, Randall E. Banik, Milon Marc 2015-09-25T20:55:27Z 2015-09-25T20:55:27Z 10000-01-01 2001 2001 Even so, institutions of patent enforcement that eliminate all uncertainty in patent rights are not necessarily desirable. Using an incomplete contracts framework, we show that optimal patent policies will exploit the risk of post-issuance invalidation so as to induce the patentee to provide a more complete disclosure of the prior art to the Patent Office. Such information improves the efficiency of the patent system by reducing the welfare losses due to improvidently-issued patent claims, and by creating more stable property rights, which creates greater incentives for investment in R&D. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:55:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3023015.pdf: 9502304 bytes, checksum: 3f5998766075f44bdc9eb9d3096c9a65 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2001 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 84228 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 192 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2001. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/82947 (MiAaPQ)AAI3023015 eng Law Essays on R&D, Innovation and Patents: Empirical Constructs and *Policy Analysis of Uncertainty text Agricultural Economics Agricultural Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.