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Nelson, Charles H. Sotomayor, Narda Lizette 2015-09-25T20:55:52Z 2015-09-25T20:55:52Z 10000-01-01 1998 1998 Within the repeated game framework, changes in the length of the review period, the farmer's probability of success, the reservation utilities of the parties, and their risk aversion are analyzed. In general, these changes affect the system of incentives designed to promote contract compliance, and therefore, the behavior of the parties and the conditions of the contracts. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:55:52Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9912383.pdf: 5266857 bytes, checksum: 9d2e0cf291c3effe3d0df8d33440a83f (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 84307 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 127 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/83026 (MiAaPQ)AAI9912383 eng Economics, Finance Credit-Output Interlinked Contracts: The Relationships Between Traders and Farmers text Agricultural Economics Agricultural Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.