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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/83048 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_13851 com_2142_5130 com_2142_684 com_2142_397

Randall Westgren DeVuyst, Cheryl Sinn 2015-09-25T20:55:59Z 2015-09-25T20:55:59Z 10000-01-01 2000 2000 Mechanism design framework and two moments of the product demand distribution are utilized to eliminate mean-variance dominated products and separate non-dominated products by their demand distributions. Model results suggest that accurately designed menus of contracts including retail prices, slotting allowances, failure fees (or success rebates) and sales targets can separate products by their demand distributions and alleviate asymmetric information problems. Adverse selection problems can be reduced by utilizing such mechanisms to align incentives for retailers and manufacturers when shelving new product introductions. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T20:55:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9955606.pdf: 6566100 bytes, checksum: 68f9b43eb7f2692464a3e42337548bca (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 84329 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 159 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/83048 (MiAaPQ)AAI9955606 eng Economics, Agricultural Slotting Allowances, Failure Fees and Asymmetric Information in the Grocery Supply Chain text Agricultural Economics Agricultural Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.