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Monahan, George E. Cao, Zhenzong 2015-09-25T22:21:47Z 2015-09-25T22:21:47Z 10000-01-01 1997 1997 Cooperative advertising is modeled as a two-stage game with perfect information. It is first demonstrated that the equilibrium exists. Then, it is shown that (i) if the manufacturer does not change wholesale price: Schedules (a) and (c) generate the same profits to the manufacturer, under Schedules (a) and (c) the participation rates are set at 100 percent, under Schedule (c) the participation rate is binding always, and there is no dominant strategy among the three schedules; and (ii) if the manufacturer changes wholesale price Schedule (c) is a strictly dominant strategy and Schedule (u) is strictly dominated, under Schedule (a) the participation rates are strictly less than 100 percent, under Schedule (c) the participation rates can be set at 100 percent and the participation rate is always binding and in general, the characterization of the equilibrium under Schedule (c) is open, except in some special cases. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:21:47Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9812545.pdf: 3089855 bytes, checksum: 81b58abfcfaa45837a7e2491d2092f4a (MD5) Previous issue date: 1997 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 85872 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 111 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/84591 (MiAaPQ)AAI9812545 eng Mathematics A Model on Cooperative Advertising of Trade Promotion text Business Administration Business Administration University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.