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Cho, In-Koo Lee, Soonho 2015-09-25T22:47:27Z 2015-09-25T22:47:27Z 10000-01-01 2006 2006 For models with ex ante heterogeneity, since models are not restricted in the way of adding a new player as long as new player's private signal distribution satisfies the regularity conditions, the limit economy may not be well defined. Thus, we are only interested in the models with replicated players where limit trading models are well defined. We show that in those restricted models, the set of interim rationalizable bidding strategies converges to the Nash equilibrium of the auctions in the limit. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:27Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3242914.pdf: 1501410 bytes, checksum: d10ca76cf73df1be9b240cec5ba18b7b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86854 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 58 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85573 (MiAaPQ)AAI3242914 eng Economics, Theory Rationalizability and Monotonicity in Large Auctions With Noise Traders text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.