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Thomas Ulen Majuca, Ruperto Pagaura 2015-09-25T22:47:28Z 2015-09-25T22:47:28Z 10000-01-01 2006 2006 In Chapter 4, we study a model where cybercrimes are addressed through a combination of private and public measures, as well as study the public goods and externalities aspects of Internet security. We find that the socially-optimal level of security is achieved by equalizing the marginal-benefit-to-marginal-cost ratios of the different security measures. The interrelatedness of Internet risks causes firms to underinvest in private and public security goods. The government decidedly lowers the level of police expenditures to induce firms to invest in more precautions. Under certain conditions, cooperation results in socially-optimal levels of private and public security goods expenditures. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:28Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3250284.pdf: 5831149 bytes, checksum: 4d9fd8dada156675a74307bdfafe01e6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86860 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 200 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2006. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85579 (MiAaPQ)AAI3250284 eng Computer Science Three Essays on the Law and Economics of Information Technology Security text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.