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Mattia Polborn Mirhosseini, Mohammad Reza 2015-09-25T22:47:29Z 2015-09-25T22:47:29Z 10000-01-01 2007 2007 In the third paper we consider a society that has to decide on the wage that it offers for an elected official, who provides a public service for the citizens. Potential candidates differ in their competence and opportunity cost. They observe the wage, decide whether to enter as candidates, and if they do, how hard to campaign for winning the election. A higher wage makes more able candidates to enter, while both able and inept candidates campaign harder for the office. We analyze the optimal remuneration for the officials that maximizes ordinary citizens' expected utility. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3290322.pdf: 1934813 bytes, checksum: 30943003a36166d858f426b3c7eefb5b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86865 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 65 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85584 (MiAaPQ)AAI3290322 eng Economics, Theory Essays on Public Choice text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.