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Yannelis, Nicholas C. Kim, Deuk-Won 2015-09-25T22:47:31Z 2015-09-25T22:47:31Z 10000-01-01 2008 2008 This research explores how an equilibrium evolves over a sequence of asymmetric information economies where economic agents learn more information from past observations. Agents are bounded rational in the sense that they optimize within a small error. Information is revealed over time by the realizations of equilibrium prices and allocations, which show the interactions among agents with asymmetric information. Two equilibrium notions under uncertainty are considered, (i) the Walrasian expectations equilibrium and (ii) the rational expectations equilibrium, and their convergence and stability are shown respectively. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:31Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3337819.pdf: 609467 bytes, checksum: 802c290fb0307df8a6f55c2352628531 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86873 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 41 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85592 (MiAaPQ)AAI3337819 eng Economics, Theory Essays on Learning and Stability in Asymmetric Information Economies text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.