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Williams, Steven R. O'dea, Dennis Charles 2015-09-25T22:47:33Z 2015-09-25T22:47:33Z 10000-01-01 2010 2010 Finally I present a model of time allocation between formal and informal labor supply where workers learn of informal job opportunities from their peers in a social network. In addition to formal income taxation and enforcement, individuals labor supply decisions depend on the number of their peers with informal jobs and the strength of social ties. Workers allocate more time to informal activities when tax enforcement is lax and job information transmission is good. More connected social networks (e.g. wheel, complete) feature lower average income but higher average utility than poorly connected social networks (e.g. star, empty). Average income may be non-monotonic in tax enforcement. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:33Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3455776.pdf: 1194792 bytes, checksum: b7a54d61786a90655a04446967587e83 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2010 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86882 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 112 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2010. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85601 (MiAaPQ)AAI3455776 eng Economics, Theory Three Essays on Social Networks text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.