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Richard Engelbrecht-Wiggans Charles Kahn Chakraborty, Indranil 2015-09-25T22:47:35Z 2015-09-25T22:47:35Z 10000-01-01 1997 1997 The second chapter considers an auctioneer faced with a decision as whether to bundle two or more different objects before selling them. Under a Vickrey auction rule there is a unique critical number for each pair of objects such that when the number of bidders is fewer than that number the seller strictly prefers a bundled sale and when there are more bidders the seller prefers unbundled sales. This property holds even when the valuations for the objects are correlated for a given bidder. In this situation both Vickrey auction and first-price auction yield the same expected revenue and the analysis is unchanged across revenue equivalent auction rules. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:35Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9737068.pdf: 3047967 bytes, checksum: 6dfb61ff6271c1ae33c632ec568acc54 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1997 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86891 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 88 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85610 (MiAaPQ)AAI9737068 eng Economics, Finance Essays on Multi-Object Auctions text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.