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oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/85679 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_14830 com_2142_5130 com_2142_14829 com_2142_8903

Lee Alston Rangel, Gustavo Borges 2015-09-25T22:47:55Z 2015-09-25T22:47:55Z 10000-01-01 2000 2000 The main purpose of this study is to analyze how institutions, the legal system among them, affect the economic performance of a country. Specifically, a malfunctioning legal system creates uncertainties that might hamper the completion of new transactions, particularly those involving previously unfamiliar parties. As a result, by narrowing the scope of trades, it hinders specialization and the exploitation of economies of scale; it discourages investment; and it distorts the price system with the introduction of additional risk premiums. These issues are illustrated with the case of the rental markets in Brazil. Specifically, empirical tests are used to estimate the risk premium associated with the reliance on an inefficient judicial system. The magnitude of the premium found in the test indicates the relevance and the potential benefits of improving the legal system. Also presented is a survey of the literature on social control stressing the role of non-legal sources of ordering in a society. A special emphasis is given to the works of Robert Ellickson and Donald Black. Then, an empirical test of this theory is performed and the results obtained substantially support it in the context of rental contracts in Brazil. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-25T22:47:55Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9990119.pdf: 5376407 bytes, checksum: 5c0a83ba151bf8c06e6990d1721eaca6 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 86960 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 94 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2000. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/85679 (MiAaPQ)AAI9990119 eng Political Science, Public Administration The Inefficiency of the Judiciary and Alternative Forms of Social Control: A Case Study of Rental Contracts in Brazil text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.