2026-09-18T20:37:38Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87478 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_17394 com_2142_5130 com_2142_236

Craig Olson Ahn, Ji-Young 2015-09-28T16:03:59Z 2015-09-28T16:03:59Z 10000-01-01 2008 2008 "The third chapter examines multi-year dynamic response of CEO compensation to firm performance. Multi-period agency theories posit that the CEO's current performance can be compensated both today and tomorrow. This study investigates the dynamic view of CEO pay and firm performance by using partial adjustment models of CEO pay. I find that target pay levels are set on ""long-run"" past firm performance and that the deviation of the actual pay level causes near-complete convergence to the target in one year. Such effects are more pronounced for the firms with weaker external corporate governance. Overall, the findings here indicate that a pay-for-contemporaneous-only-performance relationship significantly understates the incentive effects of CEO pay." Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:03:59Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3337681.pdf: 1925089 bytes, checksum: f1ad1a8e52f1b523bfa3172db2dfb533 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 88759 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 139 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2008. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87478 (MiAaPQ)AAI3337681 eng Business Administration, Management Three Essays on Managerial Compensation text Human Resources and Industrial Relations Human Resources and Industrial Relations University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.