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Wagner, Steven J. Heikes, Deborah K. 2015-09-28T16:20:53Z 2015-09-28T16:20:53Z 10000-01-01 1998 1998 The second problem surrounding a Kantian view of mind concerns the relationship of concepts and consciousness. For Kant concepts are entirely dependent upon mental unity, but this mental unity only results from the actual use of concepts in synthesizing representations. In other words, Kant's account of mind is circular, but I argue that it is not viciously so. In fact, Kant's account of consciousness not only avoids vicious circularity but also provides a useful model for contemporary investigations into consciousness insofar as it accounts for both mental unity and personal consciousness within a functionalist view of mind. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T16:20:53Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 9904477.pdf: 3824382 bytes, checksum: c176167d28507e3b1702d62f105be0ed (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 88887 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 173 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1998. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87606 (MiAaPQ)AAI9904477 eng Philosophy Concepts, Content, and Consciousness: A Kantian View of Mind text Philosophy Philosophy University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.