2026-09-21T11:10:07Z https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh

oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/87916 2023-07-11 col_2142_5131 col_2142_14830 com_2142_5130 com_2142_14829 com_2142_8903

Brueckner, Jan K. Arikan, Guzin Gulsun 2015-09-28T22:11:54Z 2015-09-28T22:11:54Z 10000-01-01 2004 2004 In the last part, an exercise which uses a natural resource extraction model to theoretically examine corrupt privatization is presented. Corrupt officials have been known to use their authority to manipulate the privatization process in return for private benefits. The optimal time path of privatization by corrupt officials is found and its consequences are discussed. Then the effects of decentralizing the privatization process are analyzed. The model indicates that decentralization decreases the total privatization time. Under a given condition, decentralization also decreases corruption and the total revenue, and increases consumer surplus. Made available in DSpace on 2015-09-28T22:11:54Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4848 bytes, checksum: 96035ab3f5e1c23cc7138a224ce498bd (MD5) 3160858.pdf: 6477736 bytes, checksum: 7060fe36d31e2111b6f21bf13b3d00a4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2004 Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 89197 Lift date: Forever Reason: Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs Restricted to the U of I community idenfinitely during batch ingest of legacy ETDs U of I Only 84 p. Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2004. http://hdl.handle.net/2142/87916 (MiAaPQ)AAI3160858 eng Political Science, Public Administration Essays on Economic Aspects of Corruption text Dissertation University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Ph.D.