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        <datestamp>2023-07-11</datestamp>
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        <thesis xmlns="http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/" xmlns:xsi="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema-instance" xmlns:dc="http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/" xsi:schemaLocation="http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/ http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/etdms11.xsd http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/ http://www.ndltd.org/standards/metadata/etdms/1.1/etdmsdc.xsd">
          <dc:contributor>Moore, Michael</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Murphy, Colleen</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Doris, John</dc:contributor>
          <dc:contributor>Livengood, Jonathan</dc:contributor>
          <dc:creator>Spino, Joseph Michael</dc:creator>
          <dc:date>2016-07-07T20:27:25Z</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2016-07-07T20:27:25Z</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2018-07-08T09:15:33Z</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2016-04-19</dc:date>
          <dc:date>2016-05</dc:date>
          <dc:description>Notions of character are central to both normative and applied ethics. Over the past 15 years or so, a growing number of philosophers have advanced empirically-based critiques of virtue ethics, arguing for skepticism about character. I show how standard approaches to virtue ethics can be modified so as to avoid these rather damaging empirical critiques. The most promising responses to character skepticism, however, are not always available to virtue ethical approaches to applied ethics. In particular, I argue that virtue ethical approaches to business ethics are in need of novel responses to character skepticism or radical revision.</dc:description>
          <dc:description>Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2018-05-01</dc:description>
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          <dc:description>The student, Joseph Spino, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2016-04-15 at 10:57.</dc:description>
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  Previous issue date: 2016-04-19</dc:description>
          <dc:description>Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 93114
Lift date: 2018-07-07T20:28:14Z
Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system</dc:description>
          <dc:description>Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 93114
Lift date: 2018-07-07T20:35:34Z
Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system</dc:description>
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          <dc:identifier>http://hdl.handle.net/2142/90762</dc:identifier>
          <dc:language>en</dc:language>
          <dc:rights>Copyright 2016 Joseph Michael Spino</dc:rights>
          <dc:subject>Moral Psychology</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Virtue Ethics</dc:subject>
          <dc:subject>Situationism</dc:subject>
          <dc:title>Matters of character</dc:title>
          <dc:type>text</dc:type>
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            <department>Philosophy</department>
            <discipline>Philosophy</discipline>
            <grantor>University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign</grantor>
            <level>Dissertation</level>
            <name>Ph.D.</name>
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