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Williams, Steven R. Cho, In-Koo Williams, Steven R. Perry, Martin K. Lemus, Jorge Ryu, Seokjong 2017-08-10T20:32:56Z 2017-08-10T20:32:56Z 2019-08-11T09:15:35Z 2017-04-17 2017-05 We study a continuous-time game with imperfect monitoring in which a large player faces a continuum of infinitely-lived small players. We extend Faingold and Sannikov (2011) to a framework in which the support of the prior belief of the small players contains any finite number of commitment types. In this setting, we show the existence of a unique Markov equilibrium, we characterize a partial differential equation (PDE) for the equilibrium payoff, and we derive an optimality condition for the equilibrium actions. Also, we provide a stochastic representation of the Markov equilibrium payoffs, which is the solution to the PDE. Finally, we show that the equilibrium action of the sufficiently patient large player follows a non-stationary process that is determined by the small players’ posterior beliefs. Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2019-05-01 The student, Seokjong Ryu, accepted the attached license on 2017-04-14 at 14:49. The student, Seokjong Ryu, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2017-04-14 at 14:51. This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2017-04-17 at 09:14. DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #10764 on 2017-08-10 at 15:05:37 Made available in DSpace on 2017-08-10T20:32:56Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 RYU-DISSERTATION-2017.pdf: 1722703 bytes, checksum: 2751e5d8131ad34053a40a4d36689914 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4209 bytes, checksum: 968dfc2bbb4e9786e113210cc776a479 (MD5) PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt: 4555 bytes, checksum: d1d259eef5f53ee759eabc35511b7bd1 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-04-17 Embargo set by: Colleen Fallaw for item 102759 Lift date: 2019-08-10T21:27:21Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 102759 on 2019-08-11T09:15:35Z. application/pdf http://hdl.handle.net/2142/97706 en Copyright 2017 Seokjong Ryu Reputation Continuous-time games Multiple commitment types Reputation in continuous-time games with multiple commitment types text text Economics Economics University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Dissertation Ph.D.