Who gets stitches? The effects of rewarding whistleblowers and protecting their identity on subsequent cooperation

Sommerfeldt, Ryan David

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/110666 Copy

Description

Title

Who gets stitches? The effects of rewarding whistleblowers and protecting their identity on subsequent cooperation

Author(s)

Sommerfeldt, Ryan David

Issue Date

2021-04-14

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

• Wang, Laura
• Williamson, Michael

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

• Wang, Laura
• Williamson, Michael

Committee Member(s)

• Chen, Clara
• Hecht, Gary
• Loyd, Denise

Department of Study

Accountancy

Discipline

Accountancy

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Keyword(s)

• Whistleblowing
• Rewards
• Identity Protection
• Management Controls
• Cooperation
• Selfish Motives

Abstract

Companies are strongly encouraged to implement whistleblowing programs to help detect and deter misconduct in organizations. Rewarding the whistleblower and protecting the whistleblower’s identity are two highly recommended features of whistleblowing programs. I use two experiments to examine the spillover effects of these whistleblowing program features on how willing employees are to cooperate with their co-workers, both the whistleblower and neutral co-workers who did not observe misconduct or blow the whistle. Replicating prior research, I find that, when the whistleblower’s identity is known, employees prefer to cooperate less with a whistleblower than with a neutral co-worker (the “whistleblower effect”). Expanding beyond prior research, I find that providing a reward to the whistleblower results in employees choosing to cooperate even less with the whistleblower (the “reward effect”). I also find that protecting the identity of the whistleblower removes the reward effect but does not remove the whistleblower effect. As a result, when employees do not know the identity of the whistleblower, they act as though all of their co-workers are whistleblowers and, thus, are less willing to cooperate with all of their co-workers. My results contribute to the literature on whistleblowing and highlight potential costs firms should consider when determining whether to reward whistleblowers and protect their identities.

Graduation Semester

2021-05

Type of Resource

Thesis

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http://hdl.handle.net/2142/110666

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2021 Ryan Sommerfeldt

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