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The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position
Baker, Derrick
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541
Description
- Title
- The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position
- Author(s)
- Baker, Derrick
- Issue Date
- 2024-07-09
- Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
- Levinstein, Benjamin
- Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
- Levinstein, Benjamin
- Committee Member(s)
- Kishida, Kohei
- Livengood, Jonathan
- Saenz, Noël
- Department of Study
- Philosophy
- Discipline
- Philosophy
- Degree Granting Institution
- University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
- Degree Name
- Ph.D.
- Degree Level
- Dissertation
- Keyword(s)
- epistemic significance of disagreement
- epistemology of disagreement
- peer evaluation
- independence
- begging the question
- principle of relative settledness
- proper settledness
- stability of belief
- Abstract
- Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position.
- Graduation Semester
- 2024-08
- Type of Resource
- Thesis
- Handle URL
- https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541
- Copyright and License Information
- Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker
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Graduate Dissertations and Theses at Illinois PRIMARY
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