The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position

Baker, Derrick

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541 Copy

Description

Title

The epistemic significance of disagreement for evaluating epistemic position

Author(s)

Baker, Derrick

Issue Date

2024-07-09

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Levinstein, Benjamin

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

Levinstein, Benjamin

Committee Member(s)

• Kishida, Kohei
• Livengood, Jonathan
• Saenz, Noël

Department of Study

Philosophy

Discipline

Philosophy

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Keyword(s)

• epistemic significance of disagreement
• epistemology of disagreement
• peer evaluation
• independence
• begging the question
• principle of relative settledness
• proper settledness
• stability of belief

Abstract

Disagreement is epistemically significant. But this epistemic significance cuts in two directions. An independence principle (with respect to reliability assessments) says that my evaluations of the epistemic position of others must be independent of disputed beliefs (both the beliefs themselves and also the reasoning behind those beliefs). But this renders a set of beliefs - beliefs about the epistemic position of others - unresponsive to evidence. Disagreement is evidence that can be used in evaluating epistemic position, and it can be interpreted as evidence in dispute-dependent ways. A primary motivation for an independence principle is a desire to avoid begging the question and a view that a no question-begging norm entails independence. If this is so, then denying independence requires denying a no question-begging norm. However, a no question-begging norm does not entail independence, and therefore one can deny independence without rejecting a no question-begging norm. In the place of independence, I propose a principle of relative settledness (PRS) as a more sure guide for the epistemic significance of disagreement for our beliefs about others. PRS accounts for the fact that, with respect to the evidence of disagreement, some of our beliefs are more properly settled than others. The permissibility of evaluating epistemic position in dispute-dependent ways depends on the proper settledness of one’s disputed belief compared to the proper settledness of one’s belief about another’s epistemic position.

Graduation Semester

2024-08

Type of Resource

Thesis

Handle URL

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/125541

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2024 Derrick Baker

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