Mitigations of potential miner extractable value attacks in decentralized financial systems
Li, Yunqi
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/129500
Description
Title
Mitigations of potential miner extractable value attacks in decentralized financial systems
Author(s)
Li, Yunqi
Issue Date
2025-03-14
Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
Miller, Andrew
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Miller, Andrew
Committee Member(s)
Levchenko, Kirill
Ren, Ling
Borisov, Nikita
Department of Study
Electrical & Computer Eng
Discipline
Electrical & Computer Engr
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Miner Extractable Value (MEV)
Multi-Party Computation (MPC)
Trusted Execution Environments
(TEE)
Abstract
Miner Extractable Value (MEV) poses a significant challenge to the integrity and fairness of blockchain ecosystems. This issue arises when block proposers exploit their authority to insert and reorder transactions before block finalization, extracting value from ordinary users. However, this can be effectively mitigated through the implementation of cryptographic primitives, specifically Multi-Party Computation (MPC) and Trusted Execution Environments (TEE). These solutions offer mitigation at a manageable cost, albeit with a nuanced shift in the trust model. For TEE, this shift entails a greater reliance on chip manufacturers, entrusting them to eschew backdoors and promptly address side-channel attacks. In the case of MPC, the trust is redistributed to trust an extra typically smaller committee of MPC nodes, with an understanding that some performance trade-offs may be necessary, but within acceptable limits. This thesis aims to explore the balance between enhanced MEV protection and the intricate dynamics of altered trust models alongside the performance trade-offs inherent in adopting these advanced cryptographic methods. Additionally, this thesis addresses potential silent system failures, such as undetected MEV attacks stemming from discrepancies between software implementations and theoretical protocols, proposing a last-resort methodology to demonstrate the existence of such failures.
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