The epistemology of empathetic understanding

Currie, Britt

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/130100 Copy

Description

Title

The epistemology of empathetic understanding

Author(s)

Currie, Britt

Issue Date

2025-07-16

Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)

Livengood, Jonathan

Doctoral Committee Chair(s)

Livengood, Jonathan

Committee Member(s)

• Neufeld, Eleonore
• Sharp, Kevin
• Hummel, John

Department of Study

Philosophy

Discipline

Philosophy

Degree Granting Institution

University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Degree Name

Ph.D.

Degree Level

Dissertation

Keyword(s)

• empathy
• understanding
• epistemic empathy
• cognitive empathy

Abstract

My dissertation advances a theoretical account of cognitive empathy informed by contemporary empirical literature; the motivation for this argument is spelled out in Chapter 0. Over the course of four chapters, I argue that cultivating cognitive rather than emotional empathy makes us more likely to update our beliefs about others’ values and unique experiences. In Chapter 1, I demonstrate how my line of argument contrasts with paradigmatic assumptions in contemporary empirical work on empathy, which often centralizes feeling the emotions of others. I then conclude that, cognitive perspective-taking helps us understand why people value what they do allowing us to reconsider our deeply held beliefs. For this reason, we should understand empathy as a primarily epistemic activity and psychological process, where the result is a unique kind of understanding. In chapter two, I demonstrate how my new analysis of empathy provides us with ways to understand empathy as a learned cognitive skill—not just an emotionally motivating tool for sociomoral change. Here, I lay out a novel framework modeling empathy as a form of inquiry that aims at understanding. I show how both the process and aim of empathizing, when modeled as reflective inquiry aimed at understanding, requires an ongoing commitment to the development and sharpening of specific intellectual and epistemic virtues, common to all inquiry. In chapter three, I develop my empathic inquiry account further, proposing specific cognitive skills and intellectual virtues such as open-mindedness, sensitivity to evidence, and intellectual humility. These specific virtues support the kind of empathizing that aims at understanding. Thus, Chapters 2 and 3 provide further evidence for my claim that cognitive empathy, coupled with the commitment to develop virtues that promote conscientious perspective taking, increases the likelihood that we can better understand others. After this, I address some potential objections to the view, moving to an applied case of cognitive empathy—I ask whether we can cognitively empathize with non-human minds. Agents we typically empathize with have epistemic states, values, and interests. Yet, LLMs, particularly, ChatGPT 4o lack: emotions, beliefs, attitudes, interests, or needs that can be met. GPT also lacks typical objective values. Given these deficits, we cannot empathize with GPT on our orthodox psychological and philosophical accounts of empathy. I then respond to anticipated objections. From there, I explain that, given my arguments in earlier chapters, empathy is an epistemic activity that requires attributing beliefs, identifying emotions, needs, and subjective values of the target. Given my characterization of empathy, there will be at least some entities we cannot possibly empathize with. In the conclusion of this dissertation, I rehearse the importance of cognitive empathy and intellectual virtues in the service of achieving empathic understanding, and then close by suggesting future developments for the account. In response to the call for clearer and distinct definitions and accounts of cognitive and affective empathy, my dissertation answers by proposing a framework for operationalizing the term cognitive empathy. My arguments demarcate the difference between cognitive and emotional empathy. By refining and making clear the definitions of cognitive and affective empathy, terms which researchers point out still reach no consensus in the literature, my project responds to researchers call for reliable ways to measure, define, and theorize about affective and cognitive empathy as distinct and decouplable psychological mechanisms. Though these capacities share some overlapping features, their differences in both function and aim are vast. Philosophical and theoretical progress in moral psychology depends on recognizing the natural constraints of our ability to engage others in the social and moral world. Additionally, progress is also made upon discovering new applications of existing social cognitive mechanisms. These positive discoveries afford philosophers and psychologists fresh research questions for exploration, and, optimistically, provide the public opportunity to think about how they might uniquely approach empathizing, given that, as I aimed to show, there exist many routes to empathy.

Graduation Semester

2025-08

Type of Resource

Thesis

Handle URL

https://hdl.handle.net/2142/130100

Copyright and License Information

Copyright 2025 Britt Currie

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