Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union
Pemstein, Daniel B.
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/18536
Description
Title
Coordinating Compromise: Information Manipulation and Bicameral Bargaining in the European Union
Author(s)
Pemstein, Daniel B.
Issue Date
2011-01-21T22:45:07Z
Director of Research (if dissertation) or Advisor (if thesis)
Bernhard, William T.
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Bernhard, William T.
Committee Member(s)
Gaines, Brian J.
Pahre, Robert D.
Sulkin, Tracy E.
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
European Union
Bicameralism
Bargaining
Information Asymmetry
Legislative Influence
Abstract
The European Union relies on a complicated—some would say arcane—set of institutions and legislative rules to develop public policy that affects millions of Europeans. Actors within these institutions must effectively navigate this convoluted institutional structure in order to legislate. Crucially, government ministers in the Council of the European Union and members of the European Parliament seek to forge bicameral bargains in a complex information environment. This study examines how European politicians construct such compromises and explores how political elites coordinate around particular proposals when crafting policy. It highlights the ways in which European lawmakers manage and share information to encourage—and hamper—legislative coordination, and emphasizes the role that the European Commission—the Union’s bureaucratic arm—plays in transmitting information between lawmakers, modulating legislative efficiency.
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