University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign

Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament

Meserve, Stephen A.; Pemstein, Daniel; Bernhard, William T.

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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/18664

Description

Title
Political Ambition and Legislative Behavior in the European Parliament
Author(s)
  • Meserve, Stephen A.
  • Pemstein, Daniel
  • Bernhard, William T.
Issue Date
2007
Keyword(s)
  • European Union
  • Parliament
Abstract
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) typically follow one of two career paths, either advancing within the European Parliament itself or returning to higher office in their home states. We argue that these different ambitions condition legislative behavior. Specifically, MEPs seeking domestic careers defect from group-leadership votes more frequently and oppose legislation that expands the purview of supranational institutions. We show how individual, domestic-party, and national level variables shape the careers available to MEPs and, in turn, their voting choices. To test the argument, we analyze MEPs' roll-call voting behavior in the 5th session of the EP (1999-2004) using a random effects model that captures idiosyncrasies in voting behavior across both individual MEPs and specific roll-call votes.
Publisher
European Union Center
Series/Report Name or Number
Volume 7, No. 1
Type of Resource
text
Language
en
Permalink
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/18664
Copyright and License Information
  • Copyright owned by Meserve, Stephen A.
  • Copyright owned by Pemstein, Daniel
  • Copyright owned by Bernhard, William T.

Owning Collections

Past Working Papers (2003-2008) - European Union Center PRIMARY
The European Union Center's Working Paper Series