The Depth of Cooperation and Institutional Strength: Assessing the Design of Regional Trade Agreements
Stinnett, Douglas
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/82568
Description
Title
The Depth of Cooperation and Institutional Strength: Assessing the Design of Regional Trade Agreements
Author(s)
Stinnett, Douglas
Issue Date
2005
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
Diehl, Paul F.
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Political Science, International Law and Relations
Language
eng
Abstract
This study expands our understanding of the different ways that states engage in international co-operation. What can account for variations in the extent of international cooperation? What can explain differences in the strength of the international institutions that govern cooperation? To answer these questions, this project addresses two aspects of regional trade agreements (RTAs): the depth of cooperation and the strength of treaty institutions. The explanation of the depth focuses on the negotiations that produce regional trade agreements. The distribution of preferences among the negotiating states conditions the bargaining environment, and consequently, the outcome of negotiations. This approach generates two linked hypotheses. First, the higher the average preference for depth among the members will result in deeper cooperation in RTAs. Second, the more the member's preferences diverge, the shallower the final agreement. Turning to institutions, this study focuses on compliance to explain the institutional strength of regional trade agreements. Expectations of non-compliance are exacerbated by the depth of an agreement, creating an incentive to establish strong enforcement institutions. These hypotheses are tested using an innovative data set of regional trade agreements. Each expectation receives strong support. The results of this study have implications for a wide variety of research dealing with international trade cooperation, compliance, enforcement, the European Union, and international institutions.
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