Topics of Learning in the Context of Electoral Competition and Conflict
Akcinaroglu, Seden
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https://hdl.handle.net/2142/82582
Description
Title
Topics of Learning in the Context of Electoral Competition and Conflict
Author(s)
Akcinaroglu, Seden
Issue Date
2008
Doctoral Committee Chair(s)
William Bernhard
Department of Study
Political Science
Discipline
Political Science
Degree Granting Institution
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Degree Name
Ph.D.
Degree Level
Dissertation
Keyword(s)
Political Science, General
Language
eng
Abstract
Indirectly attacking the enemy on the electoral field does not leave much leverage for leaders of the external state even when they may be cognizant of the ploy of insurgents. The question then remains: Are voters always gullible making it possible for strategic violence to work its miracles for the rebels? Using a macroeconomic learning model under the assumption of adaptive expectations, I display the conditions under which such strategic action works to the advantage of insurgents. Wars where public sensitivity to expected violence is at its peak provide the most favorable circumstances for rebels in manipulating public opinion. Increased strategic violence then lowers voters' cost tolerance in war inducing a leadership change in the external enemy that is amenable to withdrawal of troops. American operations in Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003 provide two important observations in testing the hypothesis predicted by the model. Time series event count model estimations confirm that insurgents seek to alter public opinion before elections in battles where voter sensitivity to troop casualties can be successfully exploited. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
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