Information science is not a science, nor is it primarily about information.
In this paper, an argument is developed in support of the latter
claim. A working definition of information is proposed, and doubts are
raised about the extent to which each of five core subfields of information
science/studies (information behavior, information retrieval,
infometrics, information organization, and information ethics) has
to do with information as defined. Several alternative candidates for
the primary phenomenon of interest shared by those working in all
five subfields are considered: these include data studies; knowledge
studies; metadata studies; representation studies; relevance studies;
and (as a branch of cultural studies) collection, preservation, and
access studies. A prime candidate is identified, and some implications
of such a reading for the application of philosophical approaches to
information science/studies are highlighted.
Publisher
Johns Hopkins University Press and the Graduate School of Library and Information Science. University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.
ISSN
0024-2594
Type of Resource
text
Language
en
Permalink
http://hdl.handle.net/2142/89820
DOI
https://doi.org/10.1353/lib.2015.0009
Copyright and License Information
Copyright (2014) Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Use this login method if you
don't
have an
@illinois.edu
email address.
(Oops, I do have one)
IDEALS migrated to a new platform on June 23, 2022. If you created
your account prior to this date, you will have to reset your password
using the forgot-password link below.
